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Abstract—Despite a large amount of attention on adversarial
examples, very few works have demonstrated an effective de-
fense against this threat. We examine Deep k-Nearest Neighbor
(DkNN), a proposed defense that combines k-Nearest Neighbor
(kNN) and deep learning to improve the model’s robustness to
adversarial examples. It is challenging to evaluate the robustness
of this scheme due to a lack of efficient algorithm for attacking
kNN classifiers with large k and high-dimensional data. We
propose a heuristic attack that allows us to use gradient descent
to find adversarial examples for kNN classifiers, and then apply
it to attack the DkNN defense as well. Results suggest that our
attack is moderately stronger than any naive attack on kNN and
significantly outperforms other attacks on DkNN.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has recently attained immense popularity
from various fields and communities due to its superhuman
performance on complicated tasks such as image classification
[1], [2], playing complex games [3]–[5], controlling driverless
vehicles [6], [7], and medical imaging [8]. Nonetheless, many
works have shown that neural networks and other machine
learning classifiers are not robust in the face of adversaries
(e.g. adversarial examples) [9]–[13] as well as more common
cases of distribution shifts [14], [15].
This phenomenon raises a call for more robust and more
interpretable neural network models. Many defenses against
adversarial examples have been proposed; however, most have
been broken by adaptive adversaries [16]–[18]. Only a few
defenses provide a significant improvement in robustness on
toy datasets like MNIST and CIFAR-10 [19], [20]. One plausi-
ble approach to simultaneously combat adversaries and make
neural networks more trustworthy is to build interpretable
models [21]–[23] or to provide an explanation supporting the
model’s output [24]–[26]. Deep k-Nearest Neighbors (DkNN),
recently proposed by Papernot & McDaniel, showed promising
results: their evaluation suggests it offers robustness against
adversarial examples, interpretability, and other benefits [23].
Nonetheless, adversarial examples are surprisingly difficult
to detect when that the adversary has full knowledge of
the defense [17]. Among the works that have been beaten,
many attempts to distinguish adversarial inputs by statistically
inspecting their representation (or activation) from hidden
layers of neural networks [27]–[30]. This fact raises some
concerns for the robustness of DkNN, which uses kNN on the
intermediate representations produced by the neural network.
In this paper, we examine the robustness of DkNN against
adversarial examples. We develop a new gradient-based attack
on kNN and DkNN. While gradient descent has found great
success in attacking neural networks, it is challenging to apply
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Fig. 1: Adversarial examples generated from the gradient-
based attack on kNN and DkNN with `2- and `∞-norm
constraints. The numbers on top and bottom are predictions of
DkNN on the clean and the adversarial samples respectively.
For a few adversarial examples, the perturbation might change
the human label: some of the adversarial 4’s have their top
closed, so a human might consider them a 9, and one of the
3’s looks close to an 8.
to kNN, as kNN is not differentiable. At a high level, our attack
approximates the discrete nature of kNN with a soft threshold
(e.g., a sigmoid), making the objective function differentiable.
Then, we find a local optimum using gradient descent under
an `p-norm constraint. With this attack, we find that DkNN is
vulnerable to adversarial examples with a small perturbation
in both `2 and `∞ norms. With `∞-norm of 0.2, our attack
manages to reduce the accuracy of a DkNN on MNIST to only
17.44%. Some of the adversarial examples generated with our
attack are shown in Fig. 1.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We propose a gradient-based attack on kNN and DkNN.
2) We evaluate our attack on kNN and DkNN, compare
it to other naive approaches as well as the adaptive
attack proposed by Papernot & McDaniel, show that our
attack performs better than prior attacks, and show that
it can find adversarial examples for kNN and DkNN on
MNIST.
3) We show that the credibility scores from DkNN models
are not effective for detecting our attacks without a
significant drop in accuracy on clean images.
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are a type of an evasion attack against
machine learning models at test time. While the robustness
of machine learning classifiers in adversarial settings has
been studied for a long time [31], [32], the term “adversarial
examples” was recently introduced as an attack on deep neural
networks by adding very small perturbation to a legitimate
sample [10], [11]. Previous works propose algorithms for
finding such perturbation under a norm-ball threat model
which can be generalized as solving the following optimization
problem:
xadv = x+ δ
∗ where δ∗ = argmax
δ
L(x+ δ) (1)
such that ‖δ‖p ≤ d
where L is some loss function associated with the correct
prediction of a clean sample x by the target neural network.
The constraint is used to keep the perturbation small or
imperceptible to humans. Our attack also uses the norm-ball
constraint and an optimization problem of a similar form.
B. Robustness of k-Nearest Neighbors
The kNN classifier is a popular non-parametric classifier
that predicts the label of an input by finding its k nearest
neighbors in some distance metric such as Euclidean or cosine
distance and taking a majority vote from the labels of the
neighbors. Wang et al. recently studied the robustness of kNN
in an adversarial setting, providing a theoretic bound on the
required value of k such that robustness of kNN can approach
that of the Bayes Optimal classifier [33]. Since the required
value of k is too large in practice, they also propose a robust
1-NN by selectively removing some of the training samples.
We did not experiment with this defense as it is limited to a
1-NN algorithm with two classes.
C. Deep k-Nearest Neighbors
DkNN, proposed by Papernot & McDaniel, is a scheme
that can be applied to any deep learning model, offering inter-
pretability and robustness through a nearest neighbor search
in each of the deep representation layers. Using inductive
conformal prediction, the model computes, in addition to a
prediction, confidence and credibility scores, which measure
the model’s assessment of how likely its prediction is to be
correct. The goal is that adversarial examples will have low
credibility and can thus be easily detected. The credibility is
computed by counting the number of neighbors from classes
other than the majority; this score is compared to scores
seen when classifying samples from a held-out calibration
set. Papernot & McDaniel evaluate DkNN with an adaptive
adversary which is found to be quite unsuccessful. We examine
the robustness of DkNN with the stronger attack we propose.
We note that the DkNN proposed by Papernot & McDaniel
uses cosine distance, which is equivalent to Euclidean distance
given that all samples are normalized to have a unit norm. For
the rest of the paper, we tend to omit the normalization for
simplicity and less clutter in equations. The implementation
and the evaluation, however, use cosine distance as instructed
in the original paper.
III. THREAT MODEL
We assume the white-box threat model for attacks on both
kNN and DkNN. More precisely, the adversary is assumed to
have access to the training set and all parameters of the DkNN
neural network. Since a kNN classifier is non-parametric,
the training set is, in some sense, equivalent to the weights
of parametric models. We also assume that the adversary
knows all hyperparameters, namely k, the distance metric used
(Euclidean or cosine distance), and additionally the calibration
set for DkNN. Though this knowledge is less crucial to the
adversary, it allows the adversary to accurately evaluate his/her
attack during the optimization resulting in a more effective
attack.
For consistent comparisons with previous literature, the
adversarial examples must be contained within a norm-ball
(`2 and `∞) centered at given test samples. We recognize that
the `p-norm constraint may not be representative of human
perception nor applicable in many real-world cases.
IV. ATTACK ON K-NEAREST NEIGHBORS
A. Notation
We follow notation from Papernot & McDaniel as much
as possible. Let z denote a target sample or a clean sample
that the adversary uses as a starting point to generate an
adversarial example, and yz its ground-truth label. We denote
the perturbed version of z as zˆ. The training set for both kNN
and DkNN is (X,Y ) with n samples of dimension d. The
classifier’s prediction for a sample x is knn(x).
B. Mean Attack
We first introduce a simple, intuitive attack to serve as a
baseline. Let z be a clean sample, yz its ground-truth class,
and yadv 6= yz be a target class. The attack, which we call
the mean attack, works by moving z in the direction towards
the mean of all samples in the training set with class yadv .
Concretely, we first search for the class yadv 6= yz such that
the mean of training samples with that class is closest to z
in Euclidean distance. Let m denote the corresponding mean.
We then use binary search to find the smallest c > 0 such that
(1− c)z + cm is misclassified by the kNN.
This attack is very simple to carry out and applicable to
any classifier. While it is a natural choice for attacking a kNN
with Euclidean distance, the attack may perform less well for
cosine distance or other distance measures. As our experiments
show, the mean attack also produces perturbations that make
the resulting adversarial example look, to humans, more like
samples from the target class, and thus makes the attack
more noticeable. Nonetheless, this attack can be regarded as
a simple baseline for measuring the robustness of nearest-
neighbor classifiers.
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Fig. 2: (a) naive attack for k = 1: The target sample z
(light blue circle) is moved towards each of the samples from
a different class (red triangles). The one that requires the
smallest `2-distance to change the prediction is the optimal
adversarial example zˆ (pink circle). (b) naive attack for k > 1:
In the first step, a set S of 3 samples from the different class
closest to z are located with a greedy algorithm. The second
step involves moving z towards a mean of the samples in S
and stops when the prediction changes.
C. Naive Attack
Next, we introduce a second baseline attack that improves
slightly on the mean attack. When k = 1, a simple algorithm
can find the optimal adversarial example in O(n) time. For
each training sample z′ of a class other than yz , the algorithm
moves the target sample z in a straight line towards z′ until
knn(zˆ) 6= yz (i.e., setting zˆ = (1 − c)z + cz′, we find the
smallest c > 0 such that knn(zˆ) 6= yz). This produces n
candidate adversarial examples, and the algorithm outputs the
one that is closest to z. Fig. 2(a) illustrates this algorithm.
This strategy finds the optimal adversarial example when
k = 1, but when k > 1, it is not clear how to find the
optimal adversarial example efficiently. Repeating the previous
strategy on all sets of k training samples does not guarantee
an optimal solution and is inefficient, as its complexity grows
exponentially with k. Instead, we propose a computationally
cheaper attack that greedily chooses only one set of samples to
move towards, as summarized in Fig. 2(b). There are multiple
possible heuristics to choose this set. One simple option would
be to find the dk2 e nearest neighbors of z whose labels all
match but are different from yz . We instead use a slightly
more complex variant: (1) find the nearest neighbor from any
class other than yz , say class yadv , (2) add this sample to
an empty set S, and (3) out of all samples with class yadv ,
iteratively find the nearest sample to the mean of S and add
it to S. The final step is repeated until |S| = dk2 e. Finally, we
move z towards the mean of S until the classifier’s prediction
differs from yz .
D. Gradient-Based Attack
Here we introduce our main attack on kNN. On a high-level,
it uses a heuristic initialization to choose a set of m samples
that are close to the target sample z. Then, a gradient-based
optimization is used to move z closer to the ones with the
target class yadv and further from the ones with the original
class yz .
We will discuss the choices for the heuristic initialization
towards the end of this section. For now, the algorithm can be
formulated as the following optimization problem.
δˆ =argmin
δ
m∑
i=1
wi · ‖xi − (z + δ)‖22 (2)
such that ‖δ‖p ≤  and z + δ ∈ [0, 1]d
where δ is the perturbation, zˆ = z+ δˆ is the adversarial exam-
ple, x1, . . . , xm are the m training samples selected earlier,
and wi = 1 if the label of xi is yadv , otherwise wi = −1.
The first constraint constrains the norm of the perturbation,
and the second constraint ensures that the adversarial example
lies in a valid input range, which here we assume to be [0, 1]
for pixel values.
However, Eq. 2 may not achieve what we desire since it
treats all xi equally and does not take into account that for
kNN, only the k nearest neighbors contribute to the predic-
tion, while the other training samples are entirely irrelevant.
Moreover, the distance to these k neighbors does not matter
as long as they are the k closest. In other words, the distance
to each of these k neighbors is irrelevant so long as it is
under a certain threshold η (where η is the distance to the k-th
nearest neighbor). This means that a sample xi gets a vote if
‖xi − zˆ‖2 ≤ η; otherwise, it gets zero vote. The optimization
above does not take this into account.
We show how to adjust the optimization to model this
aspect of kNN classifiers. The function that maps zˆ to 0 or
1 according to whether xi gets a vote is not a continuous
function and it has zero gradient where it is differentiable,
so it poses challenges for gradient-based optimization. To
circumvent this problem, we approximate the threshold with a
sigmoid function, σ(x) = 11+e−αx where α is a hyperparam-
eter that controls “steepness” (or an inverse of temperature)
of the sigmoid. As α → ∞, the sigmoid exactly represents
the Heaviside step function, i.e., a hard threshold. This lets
us adjust Eq. 2 to incorporate the considerations above, as
follows:
δˆ =argmin
δ
m∑
i=1
wi · σ
( ‖xi − (z + δ)‖2 − η) (3)
such that ‖δ‖p ≤  and z + δ ∈ [0, 1]d
Ideally, η should be recomputed at every optimization step, but
this requires finding k nearest neighbors at each step, which
is computationally expensive. Instead, we fix the value of η
by taking the average distance, over all training samples, from
each sample to its k-th nearest neighbor.
Choosing the initialm samples. There is no single correct
way to initialize the set of m samples. We empirically found
that choosing all of them from the same class yadv , and
choosing the m training samples of that class that are closest
to z, works reasonably well. We choose yadv by computing
the distance from z to the mean of all samples of class
y, for each y, and taking the class y that minimizes this
distance. Other heuristics might well perform better; we did
not attempt to explore alternatives in depth, as this simple
heuristic sufficed in our experiments. The choice of the attack
parameter m affects the attack success rate. A larger m means
we consider more training samples which make the kNN
more likely to be fooled, but it is also more expensive to
compute and may produce larger distortion. In principle, one
could recompute the set of m samples periodically as the
optimization progresses, but for our experiments, we select
them only once in the beginning.
For p = ∞, we use a change of variable as introduced by
Carlini & Wagner [34] to provide pixel-wise box constraints
that simultaneously satisfy both of the optimization constraints
in Eq. 3. More precisely, the i-th pixel of the adversarial
example is written as zˆi = 12 (tanh(vi) + 1) · (bu − bl) + bl
where bu and bl are the upper and the lower bound of that pixel
respectively. v becomes the variable that we optimize over, but
for simplicity, we omit it from Eq. 3. In the case of p = 2,
this change of variables enforces the second constraint. The
first constraint is relaxed and added to the objective function
as a penalty term:
δˆ = argmin
δ
m∑
i=1
wi · σ
( ‖xi − (z + δ)‖2 − η)
+ c ·max{0, ‖δ‖22 − 2}
(4)
such that z + δ ∈ [0, 1]d
To find an appropriate value for c, we use a binary search for
five steps. If the attack succeeds, c is increased; otherwise, c
is decreased.
V. ATTACK ON DEEP K-NEAREST NEIGHBORS
A. Notation
Let dknn(x) denote DkNN’s prediction for a sample x. The
prediction of the l-layer neural network part of the DkNN is
denoted as f(x), and the output from the λ-th layer as fλ(x)
where λ ∈ {1, 2, ..., l}. The calibration set (Xc, Y c) is used to
calculate the empirical p-value as well as the credibility and
confidence.
B. Mean Attack
The mean attack for DkNN is exactly the same as for kNN
without any modification as the attack does not depend on the
choice of classifiers.
C. Baseline Attack
We use the adaptive attack evaluated by Papernot & Mc-
Daniel as a baseline. Given a target sample z, we try to
minimize the distance between its representation at the first
layer and that of a guide sample xg , a sample from a different
class whose representation is closest to f1(z). For the `∞-
norm constraint, the attack can be written as:
δˆ = argmin
δ
‖f1(xg)− f1(z + δ)‖22 (5)
such that ‖δ‖∞ ≤  and z + δ ∈ [0, 1]d
The optimization is solved with L-BFGS-B optimizer as
suggested in Sabour et al. [35]. For completeness, we will
also evaluate the attack with a `2 constraint, using the same
relaxation as Eq. 4.
D. Gradient-Based Attack
The baseline attack relies on an assumption that if f1(zˆ) is
close to f1(xg), then fλ(zˆ) will also be close to fλ(xg) for
2 ≤ λ ≤ l, resulting in both zˆ and xg having a similar set of
neighbors for all of the layers as well as the final prediction.
However, while this assumption makes intuitive sense, it can
be excessively strict for generating adversarial examples. The
adversary only needs a large fraction of the neighbors of zˆ
to be of class yadv . By extending the gradient-based attack
on kNN, we formulate an analogous optimization problem for
attacking DkNN as follows:
δˆ =argmin
δ
m∑
i=1
l∑
λ=1
wi · σ
( ‖fλ(xi)− fλ(z + δ)‖2 − ηλ)
(6)
such that ‖δ‖p ≤  and z + δ ∈ [0, 1]d
The m samples are chosen similarly to the attack on kNN.
In the interest of space, we omit the formulation for the `2
constraint as it is also analogous to Eq. 4.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We reimplement DkNN from Papernot & McDaniel with the
same hyperparameters, including the network architecture and
the value of k = 75. We evaluate our attacks on the MNIST
dataset [36] as past research suggests that finding adversarial
examples on other tasks is even easier. 60,000 samples are
used as the training samples for kNN, DkNN, as well as the
neural network part of DkNN. 750 samples (75 from each
digit) are held out as the calibration set, leaving 9,250 test
samples for evaluating the accuracy and the robustness of
the classifiers against the attacks. Similarly to Papernot &
McDaniel, for a quick nearest neighbor search on DkNN,
we use a locality-sensitive hash (LSH) from the FALCONN
Python library, which is based off cross-polytope LSH by
Andoni et al. [37]. kNN uses an exact neighbor search without
any approximation. The kNN and the DkNN have an accuracy
of 95.74% and 98.83% on the clean test set, respectively. The
neural network alone has an accuracy of 99.24%.
All of the attacks are evaluated under both `2- and `∞-norm
constraints, except for the naive attack on kNN and the mean
attacks. For simplicity, we only evaluate untargeted attacks.
Both the mean and the naive attacks use only five binary
search steps. For the other attacks, we use 400 iterations of
gradient updates and five steps of binary search on the `2-
penalty constant. The Adam optimizer is used in the gradient-
based attack, and to save computation time, we only check
for the termination condition (i.e., whether zˆ is misclassified)
three times at iterations 320, 360, and 400, instead of at every
step.
TABLE I: Evaluation of all the attacks on kNN.
Attacks Accuracy Mean Distortion in `2
Clean Samples 0.9574 -
Mean Attack 0.0589 8.611
Naive Attack 0.7834 8.599
Gradient Attack (`2) 0.0989 6.565
Gradient Attack (`∞) 0.8514 5.282
TABLE II: Evaluation of all the attacks on DkNN.
Attacks Accuracy Mean Dist. Mean Cred.
Clean Samples 0.9883 - 0.6642
Mean Attack 0.1313 4.408 0.0172
Baseline Attack (`2) 0.1602 3.459 0.0185
Baseline Attack (`∞ = 0.2) 0.8891 2.660 0.0807
Baseline Attack (fixed `2) 0.5004 3.435 0.1385
Gradient Attack (`2) 0.0000 2.164 0.0482
Gradient Attack (`∞ = 0.2) 0.1744 3.476 0.1037
Gradient Attack (fixed `2) 0.0059 3.375 0.3758
We made minimal effort to select hyperparameters. We fix
the steepness α of the sigmoid at 4, and for DkNN, we
arbitrarily choose the initial m samples to be the k training
samples with class yadv whose first-layer representation is
closest to that of z. For the `2-norm attacks,  is simply
chosen to be 0 with the constant c being 1. This choice of
penalty generally allows the optimization to find adversarial
examples most of the time but may result in unnecessarily
large perturbations. To set a more strict constraint, one could
set  to a desired threshold and c to a very large number.
VII. RESULTS
A. k-Nearest Neighbors
Table I displays the accuracy and mean `2 distortion of the
successful adversarial examples for kNN. As expected, the
mean attack is very good at finding adversarial examples but
the perturbation is large and the adversarial examples some-
times introduce anomalies that may be noticeable to humans.
Surprisingly, the naive attack performs much more poorly
compared to the mean attack, indicating that the heuristic used
to choose the set of target samples can significantly affect the
attack success rate. The gradient-based attack with the `2-norm
performs well and is on par with the mean attack while having
considerably smaller mean distortion. On the other hand, the
gradient attack with `∞-norm of 0.2 is mostly unsuccessful.
We speculate this might be because  = 0.2 is too small and
the `∞-norm is an ineffective choice of norm as kNN relies
on Euclidean distance in the pixel space for prediction.
B. Deep k-Nearest Neighbors
Table II compares the accuracy, mean `2 distortion, and
mean credibility of the successful adversarial examples for
DkNN between the three attacks. Our novel gradient-based
attack outperforms the baseline as well as the mean attack by
a significant margin. With an `∞-norm constraint of 0.2, the
gradient attack reduces the classifier’s accuracy much further
compared to the baseline. With an `2-norm constraint, our
gradient attack also performs better with smaller perturbation.
Although the mean attack reduces the accuracy even lower
than the gradient attack with `∞-norm of 0.2, it has lower
mean credibility and the perturbation is also considerably
larger and more visible to humans.
Unlike an `∞ constraint, which is strictly enforced by
the change of variables trick, an `2 constraint is written as
a penalty term with only a tunable weighting constant. To
compare the baseline and the gradient attacks under a similar
`2-norm, we arbitrarily set  to be the mean `2-norm of the
`∞ gradient attack (3.476) and the constant c to be just high
enough that the optimization still finds successful attacks with
a minimal violation on the constraint ‖‖2 ≤ 3.476. We report
the results for both attacks in Table II on the “fixed `2” rows.
The gradient attack, when given a large `2 budget, can increase
the credibility significantly and reduce the accuracy to almost
zero (0.6%). In contrast, the baseline attack can only find
adversarial examples for about 50% of the samples under the
same `2 constraint.
Fig. 3 shows a clean sample and its adversarial versions
generated by all of the attacks along with their five nearest
neighbors at each of the four layers of representation. On the
first column, all of the 20 neighbors of the clean sample have
the correct class (a six). On the other hand, the majority of
neighbors of the adversarial examples are of the incorrect class
(a five) with an exception of the first layer whose neighbors
generally still come from the correct class. The other common
property of all the attacks is that almost every neighbor in the
final layer has the adversarial class.
Note that the `2-attacks, both the baseline and the gradient-
based attack, often perturb the sample in a semantically mean-
ingful manner. Most are subtle, but some are quite prominent.
For instance, the input of the third column from the left in Fig.
3 is perturbed by slightly removing the connected line that
distinguishes between a five and a six, making the adversarial
example appear somewhat ambiguous to humans. In contrast,
the `∞ adversarial examples usually spread the perturbation
over the entire image without changing its semantic meaning
in a way that is noticeable to humans.
For the `∞-norm constraint, as we increase , the accuracy
of DkNN drops further and hits zero at  = 0.3, as shown in
Fig. 4(a), whereas increasing  on the baseline attack reduces
accuracy at a much slower rate.
Fig. 4(b) displays the mean credibility of successful adver-
sarial examples generated from the baseline and the gradient
attacks. As expected, as we increase , the mean credibility
also increases for both attacks because the adversarial example
can move closer to training samples from the target class. The
gradient-based attack increases the mean credibility at a much
faster rate than the baseline potentially because its objective
function indirectly corresponds to the credibility as it takes into
account m training samples instead of one like the baseline.
In the next section, we discuss the possibility of detecting
adversarial examples by setting a threshold on the credibility
score.
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Fig. 3: Each column shows five nearest neighbors for each of the four deep representation spaces of DkNN. From left to right,
the inputs are a randomly chosen legitimate sample, its `2 and `∞ baseline attacks, and its `2 and `∞ gradient attacks. For
the `∞-norm constraint,  is 0.2. The legitimate sample is correctly predicted by the DkNN, and all of the attacks succeed in
changing the prediction from a six to a five, except for the `∞ baseline attack.
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Fig. 4: (a) Accuracy and (b) mean credibility of DkNN under
the baseline attack and our gradient-based attack at different
`∞-norm constraints.
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the adversarial examples generated from the gradient-based
attack with the `∞-norm constraint of 0.2 and 0.3. The black
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VIII. DISCUSSION
A. Credibility Threshold
Papernot & McDaniel argues that the credibility output by
DkNN is a well-calibrated metric for detecting adversarial
examples. In Fig. 5, we show the distribution of the credibility
for the clean test set and for adversarial examples generated
from the gradient-based attack with two different `∞-norms.
Most of the test samples (around 55%) have credibility be-
tween 0.9 and 1. On the other hand, the majority of the
adversarial examples have credibility less than 0.1, suggesting
that setting a threshold on credibility can potentially filter out
most of the adversarial examples. However, doing so comes at
a cost of lowering accuracy on legitimate samples. Choosing
a credibility threshold of 0.1 reduces accuracy on the test set
to 91.15%, which is already very low for MNIST, and with
this threshold, 28% and 43% of the adversarial examples with
`∞-norm of 0.2 and 0.3 respectively still pass the threshold
and would not be detected. It is also important to note that our
attack is not designed to maximize the credibility. Rather, it is
designed to find adversarial examples with minimal distortion.
Simple parameter fine-tuning, e.g. a larger m, more iterations,
and a smaller η, might all help increase the credibility.
Our experiments suggest that DkNN’s credibility may not
be sufficient for eliminating adversarial examples, but it is
still a more robust metric for detecting adversarial examples
than a softmax score of typical neural networks. Unfortu-
nately, thresholding the credibility hurts accuracy on legitimate
examples significantly even for a simple task like MNIST.
According to Papernot & McDaniel, the SVHN and GTSRB
datasets both have a larger fraction of legitimate samples with
low credibility than MNIST, making a credibility threshold
even less attractive. Experiments with the ImageNet dataset,
deeper networks, choosing which layers to use, and pruning
DkNN for robustness are all interesting directions for future
works.
IX. CONCLUSION
We propose two heuristic attacks and a gradient-based attack
on kNN and use them to attack DkNN. We found that our
gradient attack performs better than the baseline: it generates
adversarial examples with a higher success rate but lower
distortion on both `2 and `∞ norms. Our work suggests that
DkNN is vulnerable to adversarial examples in a white-box
adversarial setting. Nonetheless, DkNN still holds promise
as a direction for providing significant robustness against
adversarial attacks as well as interpretability of deep neural
networks.
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